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Kenneth Vercammen & Associates Law Office help people injured
due to the negligence of others. We provide representation throughout
New Jersey. The insurance companies will not help. Don't give up!
Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation if
you are injured.
In order to recover damages in most in a car Personal Injury case,
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he/she sustained injuries which fit into one or more of the following
categories: 1. Death; 2. Dismemberment; 3. Significant disfigurement
or significant scarring; 4. Displaced fracture; 5. Loss of a fetus;
6. A permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability,
other than scarring or disfigurement.
At the trial, the Judge will read the "formal instructions"
to the Jury. They are called Request to Charge. The Request to Charge
in an accident case was revised recently.
CHARGE 5.42 LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION
5.42 LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION 1 (Revised 4/06) A. Introduction
In order to recover damages in this case, plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that [he] [she] sustained injuries
which fit into one or more of the following categories: 1. Death;
2. Dismemberment; 3. Significant disfigurement or significant scarring;
4. Displaced fracture; 5. Loss of a fetus; 6. A permanent injury
within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring
or disfigurement.
1 See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. Though not numbered in the statute, the
Limitation on Lawsuit Option within the Automobile Insurance Cost
Reduction Act of 1998 (L.1998, c. 21 and c. 22) (³AICRA²),
the categories are: (1) death; (2) dismemberment; (3) significant
disfigurement or significant scarring; (4) displaced fractures;
(5) loss of a fetus; (6) a permanent injury within a reasonable
degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.
The effective date of this provision of AICRA is March 22, 1999.
Therefore, the Limitation on Lawsuit Option shall apply to individuals
who, at the time of the accident, were insured under automobile
liability insurance policies issued after March 22, 1999. By way
of example, if an individual was involved in a motor vehicle collision
on March 23, 1999, but was still covered under a policy issued before
the effective date of the statute (March 22, 1999), he or she will
be subject to the verbal threshold charge applicable to L.1988,
c.119 effective January 1, 1989.
CHARGE 5.42
If you find the injuries caused by the accident do not come within
one of these categories, your verdict must be for the defendant.
If you find the injuries caused by the accident do come within one
of these categories, your verdict must be for the plaintiff.
B. Permanent Injury (Type 6) In this case, the plaintiff alleges
that [he] [she] suffered a permanent injury as a result of the motor
vehicle accident. An injury shall be considered permanent when the
body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally
and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.
2 Plaintiff must prove this claim through objective, credible medical
evidence. Objective proof means the injury must be verified by physical
examination or medical testing and cannot be based solely upon the
plaintiff¹s subjective complaints. Credible evidence is evidence
you find to be believable. 2 This definition of ³permanent
injury² is taken directly from the Automobile Insurance Cost
Reduction Act of 1998 (³AICRA²), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8. In
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005), the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the Legislature did not intend to require a plaintiff
with a Type 6 injury to prove a ³serious or substantial impact²
on his or her life in order to pierce the verbal threshold. Therefore,
a plaintiff need only prove a permanent injury, as defined in the
statute, to recover for non-economic damages.
? CHARGE 5.42
C. Sample Interrogatories (Limitation on Lawsuit Option) (Category
1) Has the plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence
that the decedent [insert name] died as a proximate result of the
accident? _____ Yes _____ No _____ Vote (Category 2) Has the plaintiff
proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence that [he] [she]
sustained a dismemberment that was proximately caused by the accident?
_____ Yes _____ No _____ Vote (Category 3) Has the plaintiff proven
by a preponderance of the credible evidence that [he] [she] sustained
a significant disfigurement or significant scarring that was proximately
caused by the accident? _____ Yes _____ No _____ Vote (Category
4) Has the plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence
that [he] [she] sustained a displaced fracture that was proximately
caused by the accident? _____ Yes _____ No _____ Vote (Category
5) Has the plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence
that she lost a fetus as a proximate result of the accident? _____
Yes _____ No _____ Vote
? CHARGE 5.42
(Category 6) Has the plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the
credible evidence that [he] [she] sustained a permanent injury that
was proximately caused by the accident? _____ Yes _____ No _____
Vote (Damages) What amount of money will fairly and reasonably compensate
the plaintiff for all injuries that were proximately caused by the
accident? $______________________ _____ Vote
5.50 TORT CLAIMS ACT THRESHOLD FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR PAIN
AND SUFFERING (Approved 1/02)
INTRODUCTORY NOTE When the plaintiff's negligence claim arises
against a government entity, the Torts Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1
to 12-3, governs the claim. The Act provides specific exceptions
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Except when the Act specifically
imposes liability, public entities remain immune from negligence
suits. N.J.S.A. 59:1-2. Accordingly, the Tort Claims Act must be
strictly construed to permit lawsuits only where specifically delineated.
Subsection (d) of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2 sets forth a threshold for non-economic
damages that a plaintiff must surmount to sustain a claim for pain
and suffering. Note: The failure to reach the objective monetary
and descriptive threshold set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2 does not
bar all causes of action, but merely bars recovery for pain and
suffering component. The section of the Act, in pertinent part and
with added emphasis, reads as follows (as amended P.L. 2000, c.
126, ß 32, effective September 21, 2000): No damages shall
be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and
suffering resulting from any injury; provided however that this
limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall
not apply in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent
disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses
are in excess of $3,600. (Prior to September 21, 2000, any cause
of action that arose involving the threshold required medical treatment
expenses in excess of $1,000.) The courts have held that the plaintiff
could prove future expenses to meet the monetary threshold. It
must also be noted that, if the plaintiff has not met the monetary
threshold, but the plaintiff sustained permanent injury or disfigurement,
he or she may still recover economic damages for his/her permanent
injury. See, Peterson v. Edison Tp. Bd. of Ed., 137 N.J. Super.
566 (App. Div. 1975); Rocco v. NJ Transit Rail Operations, 330 N.J.
Super. 320 (App. Div. 2000).
GENERAL INSTRUCTION Introduction To recover damages for pain and
suffering [as I have previously defined that measure of damages]
in this case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he/she sustained injury that fits into one of the
following categories: Note to Judge Charge the appropriate category
or both, depending upon the proofs introduced in each case.
1) Permanent loss of bodily function, and/or 2) Permanent disfigurement
or dismemberment For either category the plaintiff must prove that
the medical treatment expenses incurred, as a proximate cause of
this condition, exceeded $3,600. (If the cause of action arose after
September 21, 2000. The amount is $1,000, if it arose before that
date.) B. Permanent Loss of Body Function With respect to a permanent
injury the plaintiff must prove: 1) A permanent loss of body function
[here insert an appropriate description of body function claimed
lost]. 2) The loss need not be total, but must be substantial. Mere
limitation is insufficient, by that I mean the plaintiff must prove
this loss by a demonstration of objective credible medical evidence
of permanent injury, because damages for temporary injury are not
recoverable. The proof must be both objective and credible. Objective
means that the evidence must be verified by physical examination,
diagnostic testing and/or observation. Credible mean that the evidence
is believable. 3) The plaintiff may not recover for mere subjective
feelings of discomfort. C. Disfigurement 1) The scaring, indentation
and/or blemishes [here insert an appropriate description of the
scar, indentation or blemish] must be an objectively significant
disfigurement. 2) It must be more than a trifling mark discoverable
on close inspection and must detract from the appearance of the
person.
The disfigurement must be visible and not insubstantial.
To summarize, to recover for pain and suffering the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he/she sustained .
. . (choose appropriate category) a permanent loss of a bodily function
OR a permanent disfigurement that is substantial OR a dismemberment
and has met the monetary threshold. If you so find then you may
consider all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff relating
to all of his/her pain and suffering from permanent injuries even
those injuries that do not meet the threshold that you find were
proximately caused by the negligence of the [here identify the public
entity or public employee]. , Reale v. Tp. of Wayne, 132 N.J.
Super. 100 (Law Div. 1975). See, Hammer v. Tp. of Livingston, 318
N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 1999). In a case where the public entity
or employee is alleged to be a joint tortfeasor with a non-public
defendant, then the non-public defendant will remain exposed to
liability for pain and suffering where the threshold is not met
by the plaintiff against the public tortfeasor. See, Rivera v. Gerner,
89 N.J. 566 (1982).
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