|
If injured in a car accident, it is important to immediately seek
hospital and medical or chiropractic treatment. Under the New Jersey
No Fault Act, car insurance companies are supposed to make timely
payment of medical bills for the driver and passengers injured in
their cars or other non-commercial vehicles. Doctors should let
their patients know there are now minimum deductibles under the
NJ Car No Fault Law (PIP). The following is helpful information
for injured people and their doctors to obtain payment for bills.
1 Bills should be submitted to PIP & also to Major Medical
and to Patient The medical provider must first submit the unpaid
bills to the patient's car insurance carrier Personal Injury Protection
(PIP carrier), and/or any Blue Cross/Blue Shield or other related
medical provider, and fill out any documents required by the insurance
company.
2. Deductibles There is an initial $250.00 deductible, and thereafter
the car insurance company pays 80% of medical bills under a medical
fee schedule established by the State Dept. of Insurance. After
$5,000 the car insurance company pays 100% under the fee schedule,
unless an independent medical exam (IME) recommends no further treatment.
We recommend doctors adequately notify patients that they are the
primary responsible person for payment, not insurance companies.
They are also called the PIP (Personal Injury Protection) benefits
under the No Fault Law. For unpaid portions after 80% or under the
deductible, the chiropractor and also patient should submit portions
of bills the car insurance does not pay to their major medical carrier
(ex- Blue Cross, Connecticut General). Patients must be told that
if they have the lawsuit/ verbal threshold, they cannot even sue
the negligent driver for their unpaid medical bills.
3. 21 day notification to PIP A State Law signed in January, 1996
requires automobile insurers to be notified by the claimant or medical
provider in writing within 21 days following commencement of treatment
of injuries sustained in an accident for which personal injury protection
medical expense benefits are claimed. NJSA 39:6A-5(b) In addition,
under this new law P.L. 1995, c 407, every bill for such treatment
shall be submitted to the insurer and submitted by the medical provider
if within 30 days of the date that treatment was rendered. N.J.S.A.
39:6A-5E (a) If the treating doctor does not give proper notification,
the insurer can reserve the right to deny payment of the claim,
and the treatment provider is prohibited from seeking a payment
directly from the insured NJSA 39:6A-5(d) New Jersey Auto Insurance
Law p 157 (GANN 2000). It is highly recommended that all doctors,
hospitals, MRI facilities and physical therapy centers also send
complete copies of all bills to the patient. Unfortunately, too
often doctors or MRI facilities fail to advise patients of high
unpaid bills, then put the patient in collection after the case
is over for the unpaid bill.
Patients should submit copies of all bills to your car insurance
company even if they believe the doctor or medical providers may
also have submitted the bill to PIP. The patient should later send
the bill to major medical. If the doctor's office and injured person
does not keep their attorney's office informed in writing of unpaid
medical bills, the attorney will not have sufficient information
to provide to the defendant's insurance company and the Court when
trying to settle a case.
4. New Care paths in Car Accident Cases Starting in 1999, all medical
providers must follow "care paths" and most non emergency
treatment approved by the car insurance company. Please make sure
all treatment and bills are pre- approved by the car insurance company.
The treating doctor should also contact the car insurance company
prior to MRI or extensive treatment.
5. Dispute Resolution to require Payment of Doctor and MRI Bills
following a car accident The intent of the no fault statute is to
require speedy payment of hospital and doctor bills and prevent
delay by insurance companies. An aggrieved personal injury protection
claimant is entitled to receive "prompt payment of medical
expenses, lost wages, essential services, survivor benefits and
funeral expenses... without having to wait the outcome of protracted
litigation." Kubiak v. Allstate Insurance Co., 198 N.J. Super.
115, 119 (App. Div. 1984), cert. den. 101 N.J. 290; Hoqlin v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.J. Super. 475, 479 (App. Div. 1976).
This, together with the right to interest on overdue payments (then
N.J.S.A. 39:6A5(c)) and the ability under Rule 4:429(a)(6) to
recover counsel fees if successful in the action should sufficiently
guard against situations where an injured party is subjected to
protracted aggravated consequences because of an insurer's failure
to pay. Kubiak 198 N.J. Super. 119120.
Disputes between the insurer and claimant as to whether or not
benefits are due under the PIP statute may be resolved, at the election
of either the claimant or the insurer, either by binding arbitration
or by civil litigation. NJSA 39:6A-5(i) and NJSA 39:6A-5.1a, New
Jersey Auto Insurance Law p 159 (GANN 2000) If the insurance company
continues to delay and fails to pay medical benefits, the insured
can either file suit in the Superior Court or file a demand for
dispute resolution with American Arbitration Association. In New
Jersey their office is located 1 Executive Drive, Somerset, New
Jersey 08873. Filing fees are $325, paid by either the doctor/treatment
provider or the patient. The check should be payable to the American
Arbitration Association.
5a. NJSA 39:6A-5.1 sets forth in detail how AAA dispute resolution
proceeds Dispute resolution proceedings shall include disputes arising
regarding medical expense benefits provided under PIP law and disputes
as to additional first party coverage benefits required to be offered.
Disputes involving medical expense benefits may include, but not
necessarily be limited to, matters concerning (1) interpretation
of the insurance contract; (2) whether the treatment or health care
service which is the subject of the dispute resolution proceeding
is in accordance with the provisions pip law or the terms of the
policy; (3) the eligibility of the treatment or service for compensation;
(4) the eligibility of the provider performing the treatment or
service to be compensated under the terms of the policy or under
regulations promulgated by the commissioner, including whether the
person is licensed or certified to perform such treatment; (5) whether
the disputed medical treatment was actually performed; (6) whether
diagnostic tests performed in connection with the treatment are
those recognized by the commissioner; (7) the necessity or appropriateness
of consultations by other health are providers; (8) disputes involving
application of and adherence to fee schedules promulgated by the
commissioner; and (9) whether the treatment performed is reasonable,
necessary, and compatible with the protocols provided for pursuant
to P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.).
The dispute resolution professionals may review the entire claims
file of the insurer, subject to any confidentiality requirement
established pursuant to State of federal law. All decisions of the
dispute resolution professional shall be in writing, in a form prescribed
by the commissioner, shall state the issues in dispute, the findings
and conclusions on which the decision is based, and shall be signed
by the dispute resolution professional. All decisions of a dispute
resolution professional shall be binding. The dispute resolution
organization shall provide for the retention of all documents used
in dispute resolution proceedings under this section and section
25 of this amendatory and supplementary act, including the written
decision for a period of at least five years, in a form provided
by the commissioner, or such additional time as may be established
by the commissioner. The written decisions of the dispute resolution
professional shall be forwarded to the commissioner, who shall establish
a record of the proceedings conducted under the dispute resolution
procedure, which shall be accessible to the public and may be used
as guidance in subsequent dispute resolution proceedings.
Under the pre-1999 no fault law, AAA arbitrations were heard by
a single arbitrator chosen by AAA. The arbitrator would fix the
time and place for each oral hearing. Persons having a direct interest
in the arbitration are entitled to attend hearings. Parties may
offer such evidence as is relevant and material and shall produce
such additional evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to
an understanding and determination of the dispute. The arbitrator
may subpoena witnesses or documents on his own initiative or upon
the request of any party. The arbitrator shall be the judge of the
relevancy and the materiality of the evidence offered, and conforming
to legal Rules of Evidence is not necessary. An arbitrator may receive
and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit, but it shall
give it only such weight as the arbitrator deems it entitled to
after consideration of any objections made to its admission.
According to the New Jersey No Fault Automobile Arbitration rules
published by the American Arbitration Association "if the claimant
prevails in the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator shall direct
the insurer to pay all the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable
attorney's fees.
5b. New Emergent- Relief Arbitration Under PIP Ordinarily, the
minimum time for a regular arbitration is three months, including
a 45 day initial waiting period and a 20 day notice of hearing.
New Rule 3A of the American Arbitration Association's rules governing
Personal Injury Protection Arbitration requires appointment of an
arbitrator within one business day of the demand, the establishment
of a schedule for consideration within two business days of the
appointment and the granting of any relief within three additional
days. 160 N.J.L.J. 373, NJ Law Journal May 1, 2000, p 5. The new
rules were drafted by the state Department of Banking and Insurance.
They went into effect April 1, 2000 and are posted on the AAA's
Web site (www.adr.org/rules/state/nj no-fault rules.html).
6. SUIT IN SUPERIOR COURT INSTEAD OF ARBITRATION AND REIMBURSEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FEES In Miskofsky v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 203
N.J. Super. 400 (Law Div. 1984) the court examined a Superior Court
PIP suit and found medical benefits must be afforded. The court
awarded attorneys fees, holding:
Counsel for plaintiff has submitted an affidavit of services based
on an hourly rate of $100.00 which this court believes to be fair
and reasonable. "I shall, therefore, award counsel fees against
defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $1,790.00 as
well as costs representing actual disbursements in the amount of
$123.12 or a total of $1,913.12" Miskofsky at 416417.
All other reported cases indicate attorneys fees should be awarded
to Plaintiff's counsel. Additionally, the court in Olewinsky v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety, 234 N.J. Super. 429 (Law Div. 1988) examined
an application and request for attorney's fees for services rendered
in connection with the personal injury claim. The plaintiff was
pregnant at the time she was involved in an automobile accident.
Defendant Aetna refused to pay certain medical expenses to the plaintiff
and for her child. A claim was brought for medical payments. Both
claims were settled at a conference in which the court participated.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the court in Olewinsky held: "based
upon consideration of the underlying purpose of Rule [4:429(a)(6)]
allowing attorney's fees as well as the nature of PIP claims and
the realities of PIP settlements, this court concludes that attorney's
fees should be allowed when a case is settled at anytime after the
commencement of suit, for a sum which exceeds the original offer
by the insured made prior to the institution of suit". Id.
at 432. The court also noted in a footnote that attorney's fees
are also allowed under the PIP statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A5, where
an insured claimant prevails in an arbitration proceeding for PIP
benefits.
The court concluded: The intent of the Rule allowing attorney's
fees is to charge the insurer with additional expenses necessitated
by an insured who is forced to bring suit for his claim. But, the
realities of PIP settlements are that the insured must pay his own
attorney fees. This effectively undermines the intent of the Rule.
In order to implement the intent of the Rule, the definition of
a "successful claimant" must be given liberal interpretation
so as to encompass not only judgments and last minute settlements,
but settlements effectuated prior to trial as well. Clearly, a claimant
who obtains a judgment for the full amount of his claim is a "successful
claimant". Similarly, a claimant who obtains a judgment for
less than the full amount he seeks is also a "successful claimant"
under the law. Therefore, logic should dictate that a claimant who
obtains either a settlement for the full amount of his claim prior
to the trial date or who obtains a settlement for a sum less than
the full amount of his claim, but for more than that which he was
offered prior to the institution of suit, should similarly be categorized
as a "successful claimant". He is, after all, getting
more than that which he would have obtained in the first place.
In this respect, therefore, he is successful.
Finally, it is simply unfair to burden an insured with attorneys
fees in order to receive moneys to which, at least in part, he was
entitled to in the first place. Olewinsky . at 433434.
The court in Olewinsky held that the plaintiff was entitled to
an award of attorney's fees. The court held that the sum of $4,500.00
plus expenses, was fair and reasonable for payment of attorney's
fees. Today, the statute N.J.S.A. 39:6A5(c) requires that if a
claimant prevails at arbitration, the insurer shall pay all costs,
including reasonable attorney's fees. Thus, the imposition of attorney's
fees is mandatory.
In Van Houten v. New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Co., 159 N.J.
Super. 208 (Cty. Ct. 1978), aff'd 170 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div.
1979), an insured who brought a cause of action against an insurer
for failure to provide personal injury protection coverage for his
medical expenses was determined to be a successful claimant and
as provided by the Rule permitting attorney's fees. The court noted
that a party need not prevail in every claim in order to be successful.
Id. at 211. The court in Van Houten found persuasive plaintiff's
argument that an insured is already a weak party to an insurance
contract, and to make him hire an attorney throughout the trial
or motion would put him at an even greater disadvantage. It is incongruous
to require plaintiff to bypass a settlement offer and to proceed
to trial in order to "earn" counsel fees, especially when
a settlement and trial would have substantially achieved the same
result. Also compelling plaintiff to try the case under these circumstances
would be contrary to the strong public policy and judicial commitment
that justice be served by encouraging the settlement of claims thereby
avoiding or terminating litigation. Id. at 212. (Citations omitted).
The court in Van Houten, concluded that had the plaintiff proceeded
to trial, there is no doubt that the judge could have awarded a
counsel fee. The court in Van Houten noted certain facts: 1. After
the accident there was a substantial and unreasonable delay by defendant
in conducting its investigation and providing a measure of coverage
under No Fault. Such delay is distinguishable from mere tardiness
by an insurer in forwarding payment. 2. This unnecessary delay on
defendant's part induced plaintiff to seek the services of an attorney
to intercede on his behalf, with the necessity of bringing suit.
3. After the complaint was filed, defendant continued to resist
coverage under a color of contention which in this case was inappropriate.
4. And finally, after a period of eight months following the accident,
defendant, just prior to trial, only then agreed to pay plaintiff
an amount closely approximate to the original claim for loss of
income coverage sought by the insured. 159 N.J. Super. at 215.
A denial of counsel fees, would thwart the underlying public policy
that insurers not raise groundless disclaimers, abandon their insured
and induce costly and protracted litigation. Van Houten at 215.
To require an insured to fully litigate his claim to a successful
adjudication essentially because his accumulated counsel fees cannot
otherwise be obtained is contrary to the principles of the rule
and the spirit underlying the No Fault Act. Rather, it was the opinion
of the Van Houten court that an award of counsel fees would more
equitably serve the principals upon which No Fault is founded. Id.
at 216. The court noted "upon review of the discovery section
of the No Fault Act it is clear that the burden of investigating
personal injury claims was primarily with the insurance carrier
and not with the insured. N.J.S.A. 39:6A13 et seq. Under the Act
the injured person is essentially required to "...sign all
forms, authorizations, releases for information ...which may be
necessary to the discovery of the above facts, in order to reasonably
prove the injured person's losses. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A13(f)]. The Van
Houten court was satisfied that the plaintiff substantially complied
with these obligations. The carrier is entitled to substantial discovery
from the claimant's doctor, hospital, clinic, etc. or from the carrier's
own physician. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A13(b) and (d). The court noted
if defendant encountered difficulty with such discovery, then it
ought to have sought the appropriate relief from plaintiff's doctor
and/or employer. N.J.S.A. 39:6A -13(g). Van Houten. at 217.
It has been uniformly held by the courts that Rule 4:429(a)(6)
permitting an award of counsel fees against an insured's personal
insurance company was adopted in order to prevent or discourage
groundless disclaimers by the insurance carrier. See e.g. Tooker
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 136 N.J. Super. 572, 576
(App. Div. 1975). Maros v. TransAmerica Insurance Co., 143 N.J.
Super. 307 (Law Div. 1976); New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance
Co. v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., 124 N.J. Super. 598 (Law
Div. 1973). In each of the above cases the courts deemed that counsel
fees be awarded with a view towards equity for the insured.
7. Interest on unpaid bills N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5 (g) provides “personal
injury protection coverage benefits shall be overdue if not paid
within 60 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of
the fact of a covered loss and the amount of same. N.J.S.A 39:6A-5E
(h) added that all overdue payments shall bear simple interest at
the percentage of interest prescribed by the Court Rules. An insurer
can avoid the payment of interest only where it "has reasonable
proof to establish that the insurer is not responsible for the payment..."
The allowance of interest is not, as defendant argues, dependent
upon the presence or absence of good faith on the part of the insurer.
Ortiz at 508-509 The court also affirmed the awarding of the counsel
fee.
8. Statute of Limitations Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A13.1 an action
for payment of benefits must be commenced not later than 2 years
after the expense, or when in the exercise of the reasonable diligence
insured the should know the loss was caused by the accident, or
not later than 4 years after the accident, whichever is earlier;
provided, if benefits have been paid before then an action for further
benefits may be commenced not later than 2 years after the last
payment of benefits. In Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co., 98 N.J. 30 (1984),
the Supreme Court adopted the principal that when an automobile
liability insurance carrier has made payments of personal injury
protection (PIP) benefits in connection with a compensable injury
and is chargeable with knowledge at the time of its last payment
that the injury will probably require additional treatment in the
future, then the "two years after payment" provision of
N.J.S.A. 39:6A13.1 will not bar an action brought within a reasonable
time after rejection of a prompt claim for payment of additional
medical expenses for such treatment. Id. at 3132. Our New Jersey
Supreme Court has often rejected a limitations defense where the
defendant has contributed to the delay. Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J.
245, 256 (1982)
CONCLUSION In conclusion, If the claimant is successful, case law,
the statute and the AAA rules make counsel fees and interest available.
Action must be taken to help the injured party have their medical
bills paid prior to the expiration of any statute of limitation.
[This article was revised and copyright in 2000, undated from Kenneth
Vercammen's original article that appeared in the New Jersey Law
Journal August 29, 1994 (c)1994 New Jersey Law Journal ]
|